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The 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) was contained largely through traditional
public health interventions, such as finding and isolating
case-patients, quarantining close contacts, and enhanced
infection control. The independent effectiveness of meas-
ures to “increase social distance” and wearing masks in
public places requires further evaluation. Limited data exist
on the effectiveness of providing health information to trav-
elers. Entry screening of travelers through health declara-
tions or thermal scanning at international borders had little
documented effect on detecting SARS cases; exit screen-
ing appeared slightly more effective. The value of border
screening in deterring travel by ill persons and in building
public confidence remains unquantified. Interventions to
control global epidemics should be based on expert advice
from the World Health Organization and national authori-
ties. In the case of SARS, interventions at a country’s bor-
ders should not detract from efforts to identify and isolate
infected persons within the country, monitor or quarantine
their contacts, and strengthen infection control in health-
care settings.
T
he 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) is a modern example of containing a global
epidemic through traditional or nonmedical public health
interventions. The interventions included finding and iso-
lating case-patients; quarantining contacts; measures to
“increase social distance,” such as canceling mass gather-
ings and closing schools; recommending that the public
augment personal hygiene and wear masks; and limiting
the spread of infection by domestic and international trav-
elers, by issuing travel advisories and screening travelers
at borders. Some measures were implemented pursuant to
recommendations of the World Health Organization
(WHO); others were implemented by governments on
their own initiative. Anovel technology, infrared scanning,
was used extensively in some countries to try to identify
persons with fever at international borders and in public
places. After the outbreaks, WHO sought information to
help assess the effectiveness of interventions in preventing
the transmission of SARS in the community and interna-
tionally. Of particular interest was information on the
effectiveness of thermal scanning of travelers. 
Methods
Information was obtained by reviewing scientific liter-
ature and surveying members of an informal WHO work-
ing group about preventing community and international
transmission of SARS. Members were surveyed with stan-
dardized questionnaires regarding measures taken in their
countries and evaluation studies known to them.
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Results
Local and National Interventions
Identifying Patients and Quarantining Contacts
Ascertaining and isolating case-patients, combined
with rapid identification and management of contacts,
were highly effective in interrupting transmission in sev-
eral countries (1–6).2 For example, a study in Singapore
demonstrated a correlation between rapidly isolating
patients after onset of symptoms and a decreased number
of secondary cases among their contacts (4) (Figure).
Contacts in these countries were placed in various forms
of quarantine or, less commonly, monitored for symptoms
without confinement and isolated if and when symptoms
emerged. The location of quarantine was usually at home
but was sometimes at a designated residential facility
(e.g., for travelers, persons who did not wish to remain at
home for fear of exposing their families, homeless per-
sons, and noncompliant persons). In some cases, quaran-
tined persons were allowed to leave the quarantine site
with the permission of local health authorities if they wore
masks and did not use public transportation or visit
crowded public places. In at least one area, these restric-
tions were applied to essential workers and termed “work
quarantine.”
Several respondents emphasized that the modern con-
cept of quarantine differs greatly from quarantine in past
centuries. Quarantine is most acceptable and arguably
most effective when protecting the health and rights of
quarantined persons is emphasized. In previous centuries,
sick and exposed persons were often locked up together
and received limited medical care. Moreover, quarantine
was sometimes applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory
fashion, targeting lower socioeconomic classes and racial
minorities. The modern concept emphasizes science-based
interventions with attention to the medical, material, and
mental health needs of quarantined persons and protecting
fundamental human rights. Exposed persons who are not
sick should be separated from symptomatic patients, mon-
itored for the minimum time necessary (e.g., one maxi-
mum incubation period), and provided appropriate medical
care at the first sign of illness during the monitoring peri-
od. Quarantine may be applied to individual persons, to
small groups, or, in extreme cases, to entire neighborhoods
or other geographic districts (“cordon sanitaire”) (7,8).
In the SARS epidemic, persons under quarantine were
mostly confined at home and actively monitored for symp-
toms. In several countries, quarantine was legally mandat-
ed and monitored by neighborhood support groups, police
and other workers, or video cameras in homes. In other
areas, compliance was “requested,” but court orders were
issued for a small percentage of noncompliant persons.
Reports indicate that SARS was diagnosed in 0.22% of
quarantined contacts in China-Taiwan, 2.7% in China-
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), and
3.8%–6.3% in China-Beijing. These different rates were
partly due to different criteria for placing persons in quar-
antine. Contacts at highest risk (aside from healthcare
workers with certain unprotected patient care exposures)
had been exposed to ill family members (6,9–11). 
Quarantine led to financial and psychosocial stresses,
risk communication, compensation, and workforce
staffing issues for persons, families, employers, and gov-
ernments. Legal appeals and defiance of quarantine orders
were rare (2,6,8–13).
The optimal management of contacts, stratified accord-
ing to risk of becoming ill, remains under discussion in
several countries, e.g., whether confinement is always
needed or close monitoring of health status without con-
finement would suffice. Reports from Canada indicate that
the insidious onset of symptoms sometimes posed chal-
lenges for clinicians and public health officials. “Timely
diagnosis and isolation of cases were sometimes hindered
by delays in patient recognition of symptoms, obtaining
medical evaluation, and/or physician recognition of the
significance of symptoms, which occasionally waxed and
waned early in illness” (A. McGeer and D. Low, Mount
Sinai Hospital Toronto, pers. comm.). “In Toronto, some
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Figure. Severe acute respiratory syndrome cases in Singapore,
February 25–May 5, 2003. Number of primary cases (gray) by
time from symptom onset to isolation, number of secondary cases
infected by such cases (black), and mean number of secondary
cases per primary case. Reprinted with permission from Lipsitch
M, Cohen T, Cooper B, Robins JM, Ma S, James L, et al. Science
2003;300:1966–70. Copyright 2003 by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science. http://www.sciencemag.org
2The term “isolation” is applied to ill persons; “quarantine” is
applied to persons who have been exposed but are not ill.healthcare workers continued to work without recognizing
that they were ill, perhaps confusing their symptoms with
fatigue, despite daily screening and repeated messages not
to come to work if ill. This resulted in transmission to
patients and staff” (B. Henry, Toronto Public Health, pers.
comm.). 
Measures To Decrease Time from Symptom 
Onset to Isolation of Patients
Public campaigns to accelerate reporting and evaluat-
ing symptomatic patients appeared to decrease the interval
between onset of symptoms and isolation of ill patients in
several areas (3,4). Novel interventions included urging
the entire population of affected areas to measure their
temperature at least once daily, fever telephone hotlines
(14), and fever evaluation clinics with appropriate infec-
tion control measures. Thermal scanning in public places
was implemented in several areas where community trans-
mission was suspected. Data on the effectiveness of this
practice are not available, but in Beijing thermal screening
was not an efficient way to detect cases among intercity
travelers (5). 
Measures To Increase Social Distance
Measures to increase social distance, e.g., canceling
mass gatherings; closing schools, theaters, and public
facilities; and requiring masks for all persons using public
transport, working in restaurants, or entering hospitals,
were implemented in areas where extensive unlinked com-
munity transmission of SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
was suspected. Many persons in these areas also chose to
wear masks outside their homes. These measures were
often applied simultaneously with other measures, includ-
ing enhanced contact tracing, which makes their independ-
ent effectiveness difficult to assess. However the
simultaneous introduction of a variety of measures was
temporally associated with dramatic declines in new
SARS cases. A case-control study in Beijing found that
wearing a mask more frequently in public places may have
been associated with increasing protection (15). Another
case-control study in China-Hong Kong found that using a
mask “frequently” in public places, washing one’s hands
>10 times per day, and “disinfecting living quarters thor-
oughly” appeared to be protective (16). The types of masks
used were not specified. With the exception of the Amoy
Gardens cluster in which SARS-CoV was apparently
transmitted through accidentally produced aerosols of
sewage (17), SARS transmission in the community from
aerosols or in social settings appeared to be rare. 
Disinfection
In some areas, disinfectants were applied inside the
homes and vehicles of persons with SARS, ambulance
tires, and pedestrian walking zones. Little information
exists on the effectiveness of disinfectant use in reducing
community or hospital transmission. In Hong Kong, disin-
fecting living quarters thoroughly (not otherwise defined
and reported retrospectively by telephone) appeared to be
protective (16). 
Measures for International Travel
Travel Advisories
Travel advisories (e.g., advice to postpone nonessential
travel) were issued by WHO and various governments. Air
travel to areas affected by the advisories decreased dramat-
ically during the epidemic (M.A. Hinayon and D. Gamper,
Airports Council International, communication to WHO),
although the impact of advisories compared with other
sources of information to travelers, such as news media
reports of SARS cases, is difficult to assess. 
Measures for International Borders
Passive and active methods were used to provide infor-
mation and screen entering and exiting travelers. These
methods included signs, videos, public address announce-
ments, distributing health alert notices, administering ques-
tionnaires to assess symptoms and possible exposure, visual
inspection to detect symptoms, and thermal scanning.
Few data exist on the relative effectiveness of methods
of providing information to travelers. Available data on the
effectiveness of screening and other measures directed to
travelers are sometimes difficult to interpret because they
may not distinguish between entry and exit screening,
specify how many entering travelers were from affected
countries, distinguish the epidemic period from subse-
quent, or include the number of SARS cases detected. 
Health Alert Notices to Entering Travelers
Combined data from Canada, China (mainland, Hong
Kong SAR, and Taiwan), France, Singapore, Switzerland,
Thailand, and the United States indicate that approximately
31 million travelers entering these countries received health
alert notices. Of these, approximately 1.8 million were
reported as arriving from affected areas; this estimate is
likely low given the difficulties in tracking travelers and the
fact that many airline passengers change planes en route.
Inadequate data exist to evaluate the effect of distribution of
most of these notices. China-mainland  reported distribut-
ing 450,000 notices and detecting four SARS cases that
may have been linked to the notices (M. Song, China Dept
of Health and Quarantine Supervision and Management,
communication to WHO). Thailand printed l million
notices; as a result 113 cases of illness (108 at airports, l at
a seaport, and 4 at land crossings) were detected. Twenty-
four cases were suspected or probable SARS: all of which
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Public Health, Thailand, communication to WHO). 
Entry Screening
Preliminary data from a worldwide survey indicate that
among 72 patients with imported probable or confirmed
SARS cases, 30 (42%) had onset of symptoms before or on
the same day as entry into the country and symptoms
developed in 42 patients (58%) after entry (J. Jones,
United Kingdom Health Protection Agency, communica-
tion to WHO). SARS was diagnosed in a small percentage
of persons who completed entry health declaration ques-
tionnaires in affected areas during the SARS epidemic.
(Table 1). 
Results combined from Canada, China (including the
mainland and Hong Kong SAR), and Singapore indicate
that no cases of SARS were detected by thermal scanning
among >35 million international travelers scanned at entry
during the SARS epidemic (Table 2; data for China-Hong
Kong SAR include travelers arriving from China-main-
land). Temperature screening of 13,839,500 travelers
entering or leaving Beijing by air, train, or automobile
identified 5,097 patients with fever, of whom 12 had prob-
able SARS. These 12 included 10 of 952,200 domestic air-
line passengers and 2 of 5,246,100 train passengers. None
of 275,600 international travelers who underwent temper-
ature screening had SARS (5).
In China-Taiwan, incoming travelers from affected
areas were quarantined; probable or suspected SARS was
diagnosed in 21 (0.03%) of 80,813. None of these 21 was
detected by thermal scanning when they entered China-
Taiwan (9) (S.K. Lai, China-Taiwan Center for Disease
Control, pers. comm.). 
Exit Screening
After WHO recommended exit screening on March 27,
2003 (18), no additional cases from airline travel were
documented from countries with screening. Combined
data from China (Hong Kong SAR and Taiwan) indicate
that among 1.8 million people who completed health ques-
tionnaires at exit, 1 probable case of SARS was detected.
Combined data from Canada, China (Hong Kong SAR and
Taiwan), and Singapore indicate that no cases of SARS
were detected among >7 million people who underwent
thermal scanning at exit (Table 3) (S. Courage, Health
Canada, S.K. Lai, China-Taiwan Center for Disease
Control; P.L. Ma, Hong Kong SAR China Dept of Health;
and B.K.W. Koh, Singapore Ministry of Health, communi-
cations to WHO). In some areas, “stop lists” were used at
borders to prevent persons on isolation or quarantine lists
from exiting. Anecdotes suggest that exit screening may
have helped dissuade ill persons from traveling by air but
may have been more successful in dissuading local resi-
dents from traveling abroad than in dissuading ill travelers
from attempting to return home. 
Transmission on Commercial Aircraft
Five commercial international flights were associated
with transmission of SARS from patients with sympto-
matic probable cases to passengers and crew (1).
Notification of exposed passengers and studies of transmis-
sion risk were greatly hampered by difficulties in identify-
ing and tracing passenger contacts (19–23). In the most
comprehensive investigation, involving three flights with
extensive passenger tracing and laboratory confirmation of
index and secondary cases, a wide range of risk was noted
(Table 4). For flight 2, in which the secondary attack rate
was 18.3%, the risk of infection was increased for persons
seated close to the index patient, but most passengers who
became infected were seated farther away, even though
their individual risk was lower (19). In another study, one
person with SARS, who had difficulty breathing but was
not coughing, infected two other passengers. One of these
sat in the row in front of the index patient but the other pas-
senger sat four rows, plus a passageway, behind and on the
opposite side of the plane (20). On nine flights arriving in
Singapore, the incidence of transmission from passengers
with SARS who had respiratory symptoms was estimated
at 1 in 156 persons (21). A fourth study found no transmis-
sion to passengers seated near a patient who took multiple
flights (22). In comparison, an influenzalike illness devel-
oped within 3 days in 72% of passengers in a plane contain-
ing a person with symptomatic influenza and grounded for
3 hours without ventilation (24). The risk for transmission
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among, but not limited to, passengers seated close to a
highly infectious index patient (25).
Discussion
SARS-CoV was contained in human populations in
2003 largely by aggressive use of traditional public health
interventions (case finding and isolation, quarantine of
close contacts, and enhanced infection control measures in
settings where care was provided to persons with SARS,
especially in healthcare facilities and homes). These meas-
ures also contained a smaller SARS outbreak in 2004 that
originated from a laboratory-acquired infection (26).
Measures to decrease the interval between onset of symp-
toms and isolation were effective in containing communi-
ty transmission. The independent effectiveness of general
community measures to increase social distance (in addi-
tion to contact tracing and quarantine) and improve
hygiene and wearing masks in public places requires fur-
ther evaluation.
Limited information exists on the relative effectiveness
of methods of providing information on SARS (or other
illnesses) to travelers. For inbound travelers who may have
been exposed to SARS, such information should include
what to do if symptoms develop and the need to inform
healthcare workers who provide care for them in advance
to take appropriate precautions. Entry screening of travel-
ers by using health declarations or thermal scanning at
international borders had little documented impact in
detecting SARS cases. Exit screening appeared only
slightly more effective; however, the possible value of
these interventions in deterring travel by ill persons and
building public and business confidence was not assessed.
Preventing passengers with SARS from boarding aircraft
would likely have reduced transmission of infection, but
the most cost-effective ways to accomplish this are uncer-
tain. The difficulties in identifying and tracing passengers
exposed on aircraft highlight the need for public health
authorities to have a mechanism for rapid access to passen-
ger contact information. In the case of SARS, the data on
border screening indicate that if resources are limited,
interventions at a country’s international borders should
not detract from efforts to identify and isolate infected per-
sons within the country, monitor and quarantine their close
contacts appropriately, and strengthen infection control in
healthcare settings. 
In retrospect, although SARS-CoV was transmitted pri-
marily through the respiratory droplet route, certain epi-
demiologic parameters facilitated its containment through
public health interventions . Presymptomatic transmission
was not observed. Infectivity in most patients was low at
onset of illness and seemed to peak during week 2 of ill-
ness in association with maximal respiratory symptoms,
when patients were often in the hospital. Virus transmis-
sion was primarily by respiratory droplets, with little natu-
ral airborne dissemination but some environmental spread.
With some important exceptions (Hotel M and Amoy
Gardens in Hong Kong), transmission occurred primarily
in healthcare or household settings, with close person-to-
person contact. Cases among children were uncommon,
and children did not seem to be involved in transmission.
Although the reproductive number for SARS (R0, the aver-
age number of new cases resulting from a single infection
in a susceptible community) was approximately 2–4, con-
tact tracing was facilitated by its relatively long serial
interval (time between onset of symptoms in successive
patients in a chain of transmission: mean 8–10 days) and
incubation period (median 4–5 days). Most infections did
not lead to further transmission, although a small number
of “super-spreading” events occurred in which single
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hospitals or households, before appropriate infection con-
trol precautions were in place (1).
Traditional public health interventions will likely be
required again to combat an emerging or reemerging infec-
tion for which specific antimicrobial drug therapy and vac-
cines are nonexistent or in short supply. For infections that
are relatively less transmissible (e. g., SARS or a strain of
avian influenza not fully adapted to human-to-human trans-
mission), early and bold use of such interventions may con-
tain transmission. For more readily transmissible infections
(e.g., an emerging pandemic strain of influenza), they
would not completely halt transmission but might “buy
time” during a narrow window of opportunity during which
an effective vaccine could be produced and other prepara-
tions made. For countries lacking specific countermeasures,
such as drugs and vaccines, nonmedical public health inter-
ventions may be the only measures available to combat epi-
demics (27). Decisions regarding implementation should be
based on expert scientific advice from WHO and national
authorities; the epidemiologic features of the disease and
available resources should be taken into account. This arti-
cle does not address political and economic factors that may
lead to calls for adopting certain measures or the economic
and social consequences that may ensue, but governments
will also consider such factors in their decisions.
The WHO SARS Scientific Research Advisory
Committee has identified further research needs for SARS
(28). Priorities include evaluating the effectiveness of pub-
lic health interventions in terms of cases detected, cases
prevented, costs, and alleviating public concerns; identify-
ing ways to make quarantines and other restrictions more
focused and less burdensome for persons and societies;
assessment of how “leaky” restrictions can be before they
become ineffective; and developing rapid diagnostic tests.
Limitations of the information include that it was collect-
ed retrospectively, and in some studies, laboratory testing
to confirm SARS-CoV infection was not performed. In the
event of future outbreaks, these issues will need to be stud-
ied prospectively so that decisions can be based on the best
scientific information. 
Dr. Bell is a senior medical officer in the Office of the
Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. He is a consultant to the World
Health Organization on the control of SARS and influenza. 
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